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Thank you for inviting me to speak. I am very happy to be here! 
What do I know? 
I have written and lectured on English legal system for decades. This includes civil 
procedure. In 2002-2010, I work-shadowed 40 judges at all levels of the ELS, including all 
types of criminal, family and civil judge. Civil judges included district and circuit judges in 
the county court, including chancery and technology and construction court (TCC) judges, 8 
High Court judges, one of whom was a chancery judge, with whom I travelled on circuit, a 
number of Court of Appeal judges, and two UKSC Justices. I interviewed 77 judges and met 
hundreds more. I observed judicial training of 50 Technology and Construction Court judges. 
In 2013, I was the guest speaker at the designated (managing) civil judges’ annual 
conference, on case management. In 2012, I conducted empirical research on 10 Crown 
Courts on the management of criminal cases. Both my research on judges and my new 
research on criminal case management were repeatedly quoted in Lord Justice Leveson’s 
Review of Efficiency in Criminal Proceedings 2015. 
Aim  
To consider whether lessons can be learned in Scotland, for rules and practice, during its 
current reforms, from the “Woolf reforms” to English civil procedure, the ongoing “Jackson 
reforms” to civil costs management, and from my empirical research into the work of all 
types of judge, and my research on criminal case management. 
Introductory Comment 
The SJI is commendable in investigating other jurisdictions. Well done Scottish judges! All 
aspects of legal reform and judicial training can benefit from comparative research. Why 
reinvent the wheel? The importance of case management cannot be underestimated. Civil 
procedure is case management because most cases do not get to trial (95% in Wales and 
England). In most cases, there is a massive imbalance of power between the parties. 
Therefore, to ensure speed and fairness, the court must manage cases strictly and speedily, 
and not leave it to the powerful party to exploit the weaker party by failing to cooperate, 
using delaying tactics, and racking up costs. Most litigants in Wales and England are litigants 
in person (LIPs) and their proportion will increase. There is nothing new in case 
management. Every judge has an inherent power to manage her court and her cases. The 
novelty in English law, in force from 1999 in civil cases and in force in criminal cases from 
2005, was to make case management a duty. From my general research with judges and from 
my research on criminal case management, I very strongly feel that judges should have a 
duty to manage cases and should be robust in case management, in order to save time, 
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stress and money for the parties and money for the taxpayer and stress and time for others, 
such as witnesses.   
The Woolf Reforms (explained in Darbyshire, textbook, ch. 10) 
Lord Woolf’s report Access to Justice (1996) resulted in The Civil Procedure Act 1997 and 
the Civil Procedure Rules 1998, in force 1999. Reform had started after the Heilbron-
Hodge report 1993 (by the legal profession), with practice directions from 1994. 60 prior 
reports had criticised the ELS as Dickensian, technical and incomprehensible, with two sets 
of rules. Research showed that most people wanted their dispute resolved, not their day in 
court. Fear of cost deterred people from using courts. The legal profession, represented by 
Heilbron-Hodge, wanted interventionist judges, encouragement of early settlement, 
improved facilities, one set of rules, plain English, promotion of ADR and an extension of the 
small claims limit. Woolf copied all of this in 1995 and his final report in 1996 but proactive 
case management started in 1994. Woolf’s aims were to stop delay, cost and complexity. 
Incidentally, as a result of 1991 legislation, the bulk of cases were already shifted down to the 
county court and managed by district judges because the High Court was restricted to high 
value claims, cases with complex law or facts, and cases of public interest, and test cases.  
What did Scotland do that was the same?  
For example, emphasising settlement/ADR: s. 75 of the Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 
prescribes that the rules must provide for facilitating negotiation and effecting a settlement. 
Section 104 says the Court of Session can make rules about procedure in the sheriff court and 
sheriff appeal court. This includes power to encourage settlement and “other aspects of 
conduct and management” including the use of IT.  
What could Scotland copy from the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) 1998? 
1. ONE set of rules for all civil actions. Why? It cuts complexity and enhances access 
to justice because it stops confusion, and makes life much easier for judges and 
lawyers. Anyone can Google “civil procedure rules” and find the home page with 
links to all rules and practice directions. It allows everyone to find out what is 
expected of them. The litigant does not need to worry about using the correct 
procedure because it is the judge’s job to allocate defended cases to an appropriate 
track (small claims/fast track/multi-track). It also permits flexibility in the deployment 
of judges. For instance, a typical case would be managed by a district judge then, if 
multitrack, heard at trial by a circuit judge. Most provincial High Court cases in 
Wales and England are heard by circuit judges in the county court. They do not need 
to learn any special procedure. Similarly, complex High Court or TCC cases are 
subject to the same rules but the judge will manage them in the appropriate way. 
2. Plain language. Why? This should be obvious. It enhances access to justice and 
recognises that most litigants are unrepresented. Lord Mackay, Thatcher’s Lord 
Chancellor, was given the crystal award by the Plain English Campaign for 
simplifying court forms in the 1980s, and the 1998 CPR are drafted in simple 
language. Lord Woolf was so obsessed with plain language that he even ran a 
competition to find a replacement for “pro bono”! By contrast, while s.104 of the 
Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 permits rules “simplifying language”, very 
depressingly, the Act includes arcane language including Latin, such as “actions of 
multipoinding”, “actions of forthcoming”, “actions ad factum praestandum”. What the 
heck are they? 
3. The overriding objective of the Civil Procedure Rules. Why? Because it informs 
everyone – the judges, lawyers, litigants and expert witnesses what is expected of 
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them. Fascinatingly, the OO is not a mere wish-list or statement of ideology. Within 
months of its coming into force, the Court of Appeal took me by surprise by using it 
as a benchmark against which to measure the fairness and appropriateness of 
behaviour. For instance, an expert witness who behaved in an adversarial manner was 
castigated. The overriding objective is set out in r.1.1. I have emboldened recent 
amendments resulting from the Jackson reforms: 
“These Rules are a new procedural code with the overriding objective of 
enabling the court to deal with a case justly and at proportionate cost 
(2)… 
a. ensuring the parties are on an equal footing; 
b. saving expense; 
c. dealing with the case in a way which is proportionate: 
(i) to the amount of money involved; 
(ii) to the importance of the case; 
(iii) to the complexity of the issues; 
(iv) to the financial position of each party; 
d. ensuring that it is dealt with expeditiously and fairly; and 
e. allotting to it an appropriate share of the court’s resources, while taking 
account of the need to  allot resources to other cases; and 
f. enforcing compliance with rules, directions and orders.”  
 
4. Strict timetabling and tight deadlines. For instance, the defendant has to respond to 
a claim within 14 days.  A fast track case must be scheduled within 30 days. 
5. The duty on the court to manage cases. Why? Because it ought to promote 
consistency and make judges more pro-active in managing cases. It also legitimises 
proactive and robust case management. For example, the judge can say “I will fix a 
timetable because it is my duty to do so. You will comply with my time limits and 
orders or risk a penalty because I am obliged to enforce it.” The parties have a duty 
to help the court further the Overriding Objective. The judicial duty to manage 
cases had already been introduced, as a matter of good practice (rather than law), from 
1994 in Practice Directions. It then included timetabling, the requirement for skeleton 
arguments and limitation of oral argument. In the CPR, the duty to actively manage 
cases now includes: 
• encouraging parties to co-operate; 
• identifying issues at an early stage; 
• deciding promptly which issues can be disposed of summarily; 
• deciding the order of issues; 
• encouraging ADR; 
• helping parties settle; 
• fixing timetables; 
• considering cost benefit; 
• grouping issues; 
• dealing with a case in the absence of one or more parties; 
• making use of IT; and 
• directing the trial process quickly and efficiently. 
Sanctions for failure to comply with CM orders include striking out, debarring part of a case 
or evidence, and costs penalties. Trials will only be postponed as a last resort. 
 
6. Promote and develop pre-action protocols. Why? Because most civil disputes do 
not result in a claim so parties need to be told how to behave fairly in negotiation or 
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risk a penalty if the case comes to court and they have not behaved fairly. This is 
necessary because parties are not equally matched in terms of power or resources. In 
Wales and England, there is a general pre-action protocol and 21 specialist protocols. 
While they are criticised for front-loading costs, experienced judges, such as 
Lightman J, said they rightly reduced the number of claims. In personal injury cases, 
85% settle at the protocol stage. Practitioners complained that judges did not penalise 
breaches so a 2009 practice direction introduced a more robust stance on pre-action 
behaviour.   
7. A higher small claims limit. Now £10k in England. Going up to £5k in Scotland. 
Why raise it? Because it reflects inflation and recognises that most litigants are 
litigants in person and that they want a cheap procedure with fixed, low, predictable 
costs. It enhances access to justice by encouraging people to bring claims. 
Incidentally, since 1973 in E&W, when small claims were absorbed into the 
mainstream courts, judges were given statutory flexibility to deal with small claims by 
an appropriate procedure and to be interventionist if necessary. An interventionist and 
“problem solving” approach was recommended in the simplified procedure by the 
Scottish Civil Courts Review 2009.   
8. Fixed fees in the fast track (medium serious cases). Why? This was recommended 
by Woolf in 1995-6, then Jackson in 2009 but was not enacted. This is a great pity. It 
could have helped to stop the disproportionate costs still complained of. Woolf said it 
would enhance access to justice by encouraging people to bring and defend claims 
when they knew what costs they were in for. 
What worked in the Woolf Reforms? 
There is very little research and a lot of practitioner comment. There was praise for 
The pre-action protocols and summary orders for costs, which reduced the number of claims. 
The number of claims has reduced since 1990. (3.3 million in 1990; 1.8 million by 2009). 
Delay was said to have been reduced by giving the court full case management powers. Small 
claims were said to have provided a public service. Experts had been transformed from hired 
guns to assistants with a duty to the court. This was said to be invaluable. The fast track 
(between small claims and £25,000) was also much praised because trials are limited to one 
day. The culture of adversarialism was squashed. There was a big change in lawyers’ 
behaviour. See the quotations from judges, below. 
 
What was not achieved was a reduction in cost, because of front-loading of preparation 
and the exchange of information, plus the satellite insurance costs and success fees of no-win 
no-fee agreements which replaced most of civil legal aid. There were many examples of 
disproportionate costs. Sadly, the rules did not include Woolf’s plan for fixed costs in the fast 
track. Lord Justice Jackson said in 2011 that the English and Welsh costs regime was “the 
laughing stock of the world” so I think some of these problems are peculiar to England. 
Jackson recommending abolishing the costly devices surrounding the no-win no fee contracts 
and copying the Scottish system of contingency fees, and this was done in the Legal Aid, 
Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. 
The Jackson Review of Costs Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report 2009 
(on the E&W judiciary website, with all related material) 
Jackson was provoked by presiding over the Wembley Stadium case where the copying bill 
alone was £1.5 million!  He recommended: 
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A re-emphasis of proportionality. Outcome: in all multi-track cases (complex or over 
£25k), the judge must approve each party’s planned budget. Some trained costs-managing 
judges now manage costs in all cases in their courts. Below £25k some injury claims have 
fixed costs.  
A Costs Council, to review fixed costs and lawyers’ hourly rates annually. 
Re-promoting ADR, so Jackson commissioned a book, which was given to all judges. 
Hot-tubbing (concurrent cross-examination of experts). 
Controlling disclosure and generating a “culture change” towards strict compliance with 
the rules and judges’ orders. Outcome: judges have become ferocious in compliance with 
timetables and orders, as in the Andrew Mitchell case (“Plebgate”). 
The rules and the Overriding Objective were amended accordingly. Most of the outcomes 
were reflected in the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. At the 
same time, the Minister initiated raising the small claims limit to £10,000 in April 2014. 
Docketing. This is also recommended in Scotland.  
What can we learn from PD’s research? 
1. Research findings – Sitting in Judgment – the working lives of judges (2011 Hart) 
 DJs spent most of their days on CM, with conference calls every morning at 10, 
then working through paper case files all day. The software was a disaster area but 
they read everything on paper, then emailed their orders. They could deal with a case 
and make an order within a few minutes. 
 All judges took a robust approach, in line with the CPR, speeding cases along, 
reducing the issues and preventing parties “keeping their cards close to their chest”.  
 In one court group, the DJs asked all parties to attend CM conferences in multi-track 
trials, because their stats showed that this caused most cases to settle but this was 
banned nationally by practice direction, which required that they should all be 
conducted by telephone conference.  
 Most research time with the circuit judges was spent in crime because of the 
overwhelming demands on their time and the fact that most scheduled civil trials 
collapsed. In the High Court I was similarly frustrated by the settlement rate. One 
Monday in the Royal Courts of Justice all 17 scheduled trials collapsed. 
 Most HC work in the provinces was handled by circuit judges because HC judges 
on circuit did not stay long enough. I expect that almost no lawyer realises this.  
 Last minute collapse of trials was a waste of judicial preparation. I gave examples 
of this with DJs, CJs, High Court judges and CA judges. I think there should be 
dedicated case management officers, as in the Crown Court for serious crime, where 
there are “case progression officers”. They should be in constant, proactive contact 
with solicitors, even the night before a trial. Civil listing was tricky. 75% of trials 
collapsed on the day so the schedules were deliberately overbooked at some courts 
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but if parties were not heard where a trial did not collapse, the parties could claim 
compensation.  
 Litigants in person took up a lot of judicial time, even in the CA. Big chunks of 
the book are about LIPs. I had not predicted this and lawyers are unaware of the 
massive numbers of LIPs, since they do not see cases where both sides are 
unrepresented. In one TCC case between two builders, two judges kept passing the 
case to one another because both sides were LIPs (“and thick”). They would not obey 
orders. One judge trumped the other by retiring. The clerks in the Royal Courts of 
Justice told me of LIPs who live in the building. They come trundling in, early in the 
morning, with multiple carrier bags and bottles of water. Some are obsessive. One had 
spent £20,000 on a 6 month dispute. The judge pleaded with him, reminding him that 
he had just £17,000 equity left in the disputed property, “You’re ruining your life!” 
There were so many LIPs in the High Court Chancery Division that a notice below 
the judge read “Please address the judge as My Lord and please keep your voice up”. 
There were so many applications in the CA by hopeless LIPs or vexatious litigants 
that the rules were changed to permit rejection of an application on paper, on the 
grounds that it was “totally without merit”. 2003 stats had shown that 40% of 
applications were from LIPs and 90% were unsuccessful.     
 The judge is in a tricky position with an LIP in an adversarial system where 
parties are expected to prepare unaided by the court. Judges would catch themselves 
lapsing into giving advice, since most DJs were former solicitors. Judges were 
generally sympathetic with LIPs and good at explaining things to them simply. 
They complained that legal aid had been cut by Labour in 1999 causing an increase 
in LIPs and, at the same time, court advice facilities had dwindled. Things are much 
worse now, since 2013-14, when there were radical LA cuts.  
 Most DJs were critical of the solicitors and trainees appearing before them, because 
of their ignorance of procedure and lack of courtesy. CJs made the same complaint 
about barristers and I observed lots of incompetence. The errors in form-filling by 
solicitors’ employees were shocking. All this wasted judicial and court time, money 
and postage, because the forms had to be sent back to the solicitors. This could waste 
a whole morning of judicial time. 
 NB Most DJs and half of CJs were enthusiastic supporters of the Woolf reforms. 
11 of the 12 DJs rated them as a success, “brilliant” (twice), “amazing” and 
“incredibly successful”. 
“Absolutely brilliant…they have transformed civil justice…it has brought an 
end to the endless sniping…extraordinarily tedious and a waste of money”. 
“An amazing change…There was some worry that judges were going to 
become very draconian and ty and dictate things…I think there is a good 
working relationship and that is to the advantage to the people who litigate” 
(p. 255). 
 I was surprised that, despite their obligation under the rules, DJs very seldom 
mentioned ADR. Some considered it inappropriate to refer a small claimant to ADR 
but as ex-solicitors, they did expect litigants to negotiate prior to coming to court. 
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Interestingly, however, Baldwin, in his research on small claims, found that some 
small claimants assumed that it would be forbidden to approach the other side! In 
1995 I met a DJ who would not allow anyone into his courtroom who had not spoken 
to the other side.   
 One striking finding of the research, especially in the HC and CA, was that civil cases 
did not always get managed according the timetables in the rules and practice 
directions because of lawyers’ sloppiness, such as delivering supplementary bundles 
on the morning of trial, or bureaucratic mess, such as the time taken to deliver bundles 
and skeleton arguments from post-room to judge within the Royal Courts of Justice. 
Lawyers caused another problem in the CA – wasting judges’ time by withdrawing 
arguments after the judges had read them, “messing us about”. Lawyers also 
exasperate the CA continually by overloading them with authorities, as can be seen by 
the case law where the CA regularly castigates them. 
 Weirdly, cases are not managed at all in the UKSC by the Justices. I am currently 
writing about that. The parties have to agree a time estimate for the case but not for 
each party. There is far too much recitation of legislation and so on, in the courtroom.  
 While civil case management, in the county court, the HC and the CA generally ran 
smoothly, the same could not be said for criminal cases in the Crown Court or the CA. 
In the Crown Court, no observed trial started on time and went along uninterrupted. 
As a tax-payer and lawyer I was often disgusted by lawyers’ incompetence and 
judges’ laissez-faire attitudes. In the CA, I suggested to CA judges that they could 
save a lot of time and money by copying the strict case management of the 
Commercial Court (and many of them were Commercial Court judges) but they said 
the lawyers were not up to it (and not paid enough!). 
“Judicial Case management in Ten Crown Courts” article, 2014 
10 Crown Courts on 5 circuits. Observed 1 or 2 judges each, in 2012; interviewed 10 resident 
(managing) judges + 7 others.  
Why? In 2011, I noticed very different regimes and approaches in court. Aims: to examine 
case management regimes and the effects of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2005 (in force 
2006), which introduced a judicial duty to manage criminal cases, like their civil case 
management duty. 
Headlines (there are many other findings) 
 Court regimes differed. e.g. Gold Court had a pre-trial review (PTR) in every case. 
Some judges or courts were notorious, e.g. ‘Mad Harry’s “slash ‘n burn”’. 
 Judges differed. At each court there was a difference in court style between judges. 
Judges generally disagreed on principle, e.g. on defence statements, and tactics, such 
as on the usefulness of Goodyear guilty plea deals (which caused debate between all 
judges at Orange court); Judges Indigo 2 and 3 were trying to import practices from 
their former courts “we were much more robust in the Midlands”. Judges changed 
their views over time: Resident Violet changed his plea and case management 
(PCMH) approach and listing regime radically, in 2007, after a “road to Damascus” 
moment. Some judges were on a mission: Judge Gold 3, from a civil background, was 
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on a frolic of his own, to the CA, repeatedly, because, unusully, he imposed costs 
penalties and this upset lawyers. 
 The Criminal Procedure Rules were ‘irrelevant’ in some courts. Judges said they 
had instilled strict case management years well before the 2005 Rules, using their case 
management powers. Incidentally, the Rules did not introduce case management in 
2006, contra to the understanding of most academics and some judges, because judges 
already had case management powers. Interesting question: what activities are 
appropriate for a rule and what should be left to practice? 
 Did the Rules effect a complete culture change? 1 x yes, 14 x no, 2 x “starting”. 
 Culture had changed everywhere but maybe not because of the Rules.  
 Cracked trials (last-minute guilty pleas) had not reduced since 2006 but judges did 
not see this as a bad thing. 
 There were no virtual plea and case management hearings, unlike in civil 
proceedings. The defendant was always present, sometimes via video link from 
prison. 
 The Plea and Case Management form was criticised as too long, Resident Yellow: 
“frightening waste of public money”, Black used their own checklist, Orange court 
their used own electronic template, Judges Indigo 3 and Gold 3 asked for an 
electronic template. Some courts used additional forms. 
 Defence statements had markedly improved since my research for my book. Some 
were formulaic, demanding information.  
 Costs were very seldom imposed. Some courts were notorious, e.g. Kingston. Judge 
Gold 3 favoured them but didn’t understand their effects on lawyers. 
 Crown Courts which had tried enforcement courts, often at 4.00 on Fridays, found 
they were strikingly sucessful and rapidly rendered themselves redundant, as they had 
an educative effect on the local lawyers. 
 13 of 17 judges noted no culture change in prosecution disclosure. Judges were 
very concerned: Resident Yellow, “CPS depresses me”; Resident Silver, “CPS 
driving me to suicide”. Judge Indigo 2, an ex-CPS manager, CPS “frightens me”. 
Judge Gold 2, “we’ve gone backwards”. 
 North-South divide. Northern judges perceived SE circuit judges as poor managers. 
Judges at Orange, Yellow and Green, the Northern and NE courts, said “We’re 
suffering because of their inefficiency”. 
 The new “early guilty plea” scheme was criticised as delaying proceedings in some 
courts, e.g. at Yellow, Green (Northern) and Blue (Midlands). The procedure was 
underused.  
 The Training DVD, depicting very robust judicial case management was criticised: 
“not real life”, “people were shocked”, “unrealistic”. 
Conclusions from this research 
 Judges could learn great lessons from one another, especially from the oldest 
regimes, e.g. Yellow Court. Resident Yellow had documented how he had changed 
the culture. This information has not been captured. He retired in 2013. Also, nobody 
captured/copied the previous successful electronic “traffic light” case management 
scheme at Orange court.   
 Judges could use an internet portal to exchange notes on good practice. See the 
Advocates’ Gateway by Professor Penny Cooper – Kingston University. County court 
district judges have invented and circulated civil electronic case management 
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templates since pre-2000. (3 circuit judges in my book used to be civil district judges 
– they could be useful in developing such a portal and in monitoring practice). 
 Non-resident (non-managing) judges should be included in discussion about case 
management Rules and practice, as well as former civil district judges. Some 
“anorack”-judges have good ideas, eg Judges Indigo 2 (management expert) and 
Orange 3. Judges Violet 2 and 3 had been given case management responsibilities for 
their courts.  
 Crucially, the Criminal Procedure Rules played a minor role in those courts 
which already had strict case management regimes before 2005. 
 
Conclusion 
I have spent much of my time since 2002 sitting beside all types of judge, civil, criminal and 
family, throughout the six circuits of England and Wales, from DJ to UKSC. I’m convinced 
that strict case management by the judge benefits everyone, by speeding the case through the 
court, narrowing the issues, cutting private and public costs, encouraging negotiated 
settlements and ADR and minimising stress to the parties. I feel there has to be a statutory 
duty on the judge to proactively manage the case, an overriding objective and a duty on the 
parties to uphold the overriding objective and support the judge. The statutory duty 
legitimises the judge in taking a robust stance. This statutory change, coupled with robust 
strict practice will educate lawyers (and expert witnesses), eventually, and change the culture. 
There is no theoretical reason why the parties should be left to run a case. It does not derogate 
from the adversarial system one jot if the judge runs the case. We must distinguish between 
an adversarial system which is good, and required by Art 6 of the European Convention, and 
adversarialism, which is corrosive end detrimental to weaker parties. It is hard work, being a 
hands-on strict case manager, educating lawyers about your expectations and probably 
educating some of your colleagues too but it will pay off. You will change the culture. You 
will do more justice.  
Summary of Supporting Recommendations and Other Points 
 Develop one set of Civil Procedure Rules, in plain English, because this enhances 
access to justice, which is essential for the rule of law. Most litigants do not have 
lawyers. Lawyers and judges should not be allowed to aggrandise themselves by 
hiding behind legal Latin! (and wigs and gowns). 
 Develop pre-action protocols. They encourage settlement. Punish parties who ignore 
them, especially powerful parties, as this protects the small party and enforces fair 
settlement, or a fair trial, rather than settlement.  
 Raise your small claims limit. This benefits litigants because most are unrepresented. 
This enhances access to justice by making legal costs predictable, if the costs are 
fixed and low. It also allows the judge to be interventionist, recognising that 
unrepresented parties need the judge’s help to put their case. 
 Place a duty on the judge to raise the question of ADR then educate judges in ADR 
and get them to discuss it with the parties and encourage it. 
 Develop civil case progression officers whose job it is to repeatedly contact parties in 
the lead-up to the trial, tracking case progression to try and obviate the waste of 
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judicial preparation caused by last-minute case collapse. These officers should also 
check that skeletons and bundles are delivered in time.   
 Recognising that most litigants are unrepresented, train judges in judgecraft . Ensure 
that support mechanisms are in place so do not do what the English did, and close 
court counters and court based support systems at the same time as decimating legal 
aid! Recognise the demands on judges’ time and energy and court time caused by 
litigants in person. Put in place not only support mechanisms but strict filter systems 
to filter out pointless applications.  
